











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477042
Why the iPhone Won’t Last Forever and 




1 and Hal J. Singer
2
Because of the overwhelming, positive response to the iPhone as compared to other smart phones, 
exclusive agreements between handset makers and wireless carriers have come under increasing 
scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. In this paper, we document the myriad revolutions that have 
occurred in the mobile handset market over the past twenty years. Although casual observers have often 
claimed that a particular innovation was here to stay, they commonly are proven wrong by unforeseen 
developments in this fast-changing marketplace. We argue that exclusive agreements can  play an 
important role  in helping to ensure  that another  must-have  device  will soon come  along that will 
supplant the iPhone, and generate large benefits for consumers. These agreements, which encourage 
risk taking, increase choice, and frequently lower prices, should be applauded by the government. In 
contrast, government regulation that would require forced sharing of a successful break-through 
technology is likely to stifle innovation and hurt consumer welfare. 
  
Introduction 
In the summer of 2009, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing to explore the 
competitive effects of exclusive handset agreements  in the wireless industry. Exclusive agreements 
typically allow one particular wireless operator to serve as the sole distributor of a manufacturer’s 
handset for a given period of time. The new chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has announced his intention to explore the issue of handset exclusivity. There are several pending 
petitions before the FCC that raise this issue, one of which seeks to ban exclusive handset contracts.  
A key element that appears to be missing from the policy debate is whether exclusive contracts 
harm consumers. Antitrust scholars recognize that exclusive contracts have the potential under certain 
conditions to reduce consumer welfare. One condition concerns market power: one of the firms seeking 
an exclusive agreement must dominate access to consumers. A second condition is that the excluded 
product is needed by the dominant firm’s rivals to constrain the prices the dominant firm can charge 
consumers. Economists sometimes refer to such a product as a “must-have” input. This article evaluates 
both conditions as applied to the U.S. mobile handset market. In Part II of this paper, we analyze 
whether Apple or any other manufacturer has established a dominant share in the mobile handset 
market. Market shares for smartphone sales in the United States reveal that, in the first quarter of 2009, 
RIM’s BlackBerry Curve moved past Apple’s iPhone to become the best-selling consumer smartphone in 
the United States—a result that is not consistent with the notion of dominance.
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rapid pace of innovation in handsets, which resulted in shifting market shares among handset makers. 
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2004 have been introduced pursuant to an exclusive contract. Next, we analyze whether the iPhone is a 
“must-have” input for wireless carriers, and argue that it is not. 
Antitrust scholars also recognize that exclusive agreements can promote consumer welfare by 
encouraging risk-taking by entrepreneurs, and by aligning the incentives of dealers and manufacturers. 
For example, the economics literature recognizes that exclusive contracts can address dealer-incentive 
issues that arise when the manufacturer wants the dealer to invest in specific facilities or human capital 
to provide better service to consumers. In the absence of such agreements, dealers may not invest in an 
efficient level of promotion. Because exclusive contracts have the potential to increase or decrease 
welfare, they are analyzed under a “rule of reason” framework, which balances the benefits and costs of 
permitting such contracts. In Part III of this report, we explain that exclusive handset contracts are 
motivated for three procompetitive reasons: (1) to share the enormous risk associated with launching a 
new device, (2) to align the incentives of the carrier with the handset maker, and (3) to ensure network 
quality. From the perspective of a handset maker like Apple, aligning with a single carrier like AT&T 
ensures that Apple does not incur all of the downside risk in the event that the phone is not a success. 
The agreement also ensures that AT&T will make iPhone-specific investments such as marketing 
support, handset subsidies, and modifying its network to accommodate bandwidth-intensive 
applications. 
New technologies often seemingly emerge from nowhere, but also frequently lose their luster 
quickly. Consider the fleeting success of Second Life, the virtual online world that was supposed to 
induce Americans to check out of their first life. Analysts predicted that Second Life could top the World 
Wide Web as the  way to tap the Internet’s resources.
4  Some  even  thought it could challenge the 
Microsoft Windows operating system.
5 The hype induced corporate giants like Nike and IBM to develop 
a presence in this virtual world.
6 Reuters stationed a reporter at its first virtual news bureau inside 
Second Life.
7 IBM sank $10 million on initiatives to further develop Second Life and the online three-
dimensional world generally.
8 Despite this hype, Second Life became part of a “hat trick that didn’t 
happen,” and the frenzy surrounding the online game fizzled.
9 As of July 2009, the site was populated by 
less than 90,000 users  at a time.
10
MySpace marks another example of the transient nature of a so-called dominant technology. 
MySpace emerged in 2003, and by 2006, had grown to 70 million users.
  Second  Life’s  history has become just another cautionary tale, 
illustrating the short shelf life of some technologies that had high expectations.  
11
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social network.
12 Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. paid $649 million in 2005 for Intermix Media, owner of 
MySpace, before the company had managed to turn a significant profit.
13 Some analysts asserted that  
MySpace was a “natural monopoly,” citing the high switching cost of moving from one social network to 
another as an impenetrable “network effect” giving MySpace dominance over other social networks.
14 
By June 2009, Facebook, a rival social network, roughly doubled in size and became the largest network 
in the United States and globally while MySpace lost 5 percent of its users.
15
In this article, we explain how the mobile handset market is subject to these same disruptive 
forces—an iconic handset emerges, is quickly crowned the “winner,” and soon thereafter is replaced by 
another technology that was not even conceived of at the time the “winner” was launched. Many 
iPhone-inspired smartphones, including the Blackberry Storm and the HTC G1, could unseat the iPhone 
in the smartphone segment. We argue that heavy-handed regulation of such dynamic markets is likely 
to  reduce welfare on net.
  
16  The cost of erring  through  regulatory  intervention—for example, by 
restricting voluntary private agreements that promote risk taking—can be significant.
17
I.  A brief economic history of disruptive revolutions in the handset market  
 Delaying the 
benefits associated with innovation in mobile handsets could cost consumers dearly. In sum, exclusive 
contracts between handset makers and wireless carriers benefit consumers by encouraging innovation 
by both handset makers and wireless service providers that are vying for market share, and by enabling 
some handset makers to remain viable. These benefits take the form of greater variety of choices in 
handsets,  greatly enhanced capabilities, and a more affordable range of device options. Banning 
exclusive contracts could have the unintended consequence of reducing innovation, reducing options, 
raising prices, and potentially establishing market dominance for an incumbent handset maker. 
The preceding examples of products that were thought to be the “next big thing” and turned 
out to be passing fancies suggest that we should be careful in making predictions about the dominance 
of a technology, network, or even an idea.
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A.  Innovative handsets from the last two decades  
Marty Cooper is the engineer who is credited with converting the cellular technology used in car 
phones of the 1970s into portable handsets. In April 1973, Motorola hosted a press conference at the 
Hilton New York to introduce Cooper’s prototype of a cell phone. The handset, called a DynaTAC, had 35 
minutes of talk time and weighed 2.2 pounds. In 1983, Motorola introduced a “lighter” version of 
DynaTAC (still weighing over one pound) with a list price of $4,000.
19
In 1989, Motorola introduced the MicroTAC flip phone.
  
20 At 12 ounces, it was approximately 
half the size of any of its rivals and was able to fit into a shirt pocket; the phone was originally priced at 
$2,995 (a full 25 percent discount from the earlier model).
21 Fortune magazine reported that the end of 
innovation was near: “Portable phones won’t get a lot smaller than this one. After all, they have to reach 
from your ear to your mouth.”
22 In 1996, Motorola offered a 3.1 ounce StarTAC mobile phone, hailed as 
the first wearable phone. One media source suggested that StarTAC was “about to revolutionize the 
cellular industry.”
23 Another analyst (incorrectly) predicted that the StarTAC would ensure that the next 
generation of cell phones would be “worn on your wrist, a la Dick Tracy.”
24 Still others predicted the 
introduction of “kid phones,” with “only two buttons: one for mommy and one for daddy.”
25
Although each of these phones was considered cutting-edge or “iconic” when introduced, these 
names have faded into obscurity with the passage of time. In this decade, brands like Treo, Blackberry, 
Razr, and iPhone have all competed for dominance in the handset market. The evolution of mobile 
handsets  from  the mid-1990s  through 2002 set the stage for  the introduction of personal digital 
assistants, thin phones, and more recently, smartphones.  
 With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that neither the MicroTAC nor the StarTAC would mark the pinnacle 
of innovation in cell phones.  
TABLE 1: A HISTORY OF ICONIC HANDSETS 
Company  Model  Year Introduced  Category  Innovation  Exclusive 
(w/ whom) 
Motorola  MicroTAC  1989  NA  Flip-phone   
Motorola  StarTAC  1996  NA  Reduced size   
Nokia  9000 
Communicator 





Handspring  Treo 180  2002  Personal digital 
assistant 
Combine personal 
digital assistant w/ 
cell phone 
 
Motorola  Razr V3  2004  Thin  Reduced size  AT&T 
Danger  Sidekick  2002  Smartphone  Offer email and  T-Mobile 
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web surfing to 
mass market 
RIM  Blackberry Pearl  2006  Smartphone  Reduced size; 
integration of push 
e-mail with media 
T-Mobile 
RIM  Blackberry Curve  2007  Smartphone  Reduced size; 
integration of push 
e-mail with media 
AT&T 
Apple  iPhone  2007  Smartphone  Multi-touch 
screen, operate on 




Palm  Pre  2009  Smartphone  Run multiple apps 
at same time; 
combines e-mail, 
pictures, video, 
and web contacts 
Sprint 
HTC  G1  2009  Smartphone  Google’s Android 
platform, already 





Table 1 shows that exclusive contracts were not always the norm; however, many, if not all, of the iconic 
handsets introduced since 2004 have been introduced pursuant to an exclusive contract. Although we 
cannot demonstrate that exclusive agreements were the cause of the recent innovation, it is clear that 
exclusive contracts are associated with recent innovation. (We discuss the use of these contracts, and 
the reasons for believing they promote innovation in this case, in Part III.) 
Personal Digital Assistants. In 1993, BellSouth and IBM jointly introduced the Simon Personal 
Communicator, the first mobile handset that included pager, calculator, and calendar.
26 The handset 
weighed 21 ounces and sold for $900.
27 The Simon was hailed for its uniqueness. One article announcing 
its release described it as “the first time a company had placed a computer in a cellular phone, rather 
than placing a cellular phone in a computer.”
28
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In 1996, Nokia launched the Nokia 9000 Communicator.
29  The Nokia 9000 was hailed as 
“revolutionary” and as signaling “the birth of the real information age.”
30 The device combined phone, 
fax, address book, and e-mail in a single interface.
31
In the same year, Palm introduced the Pilot as its first personal digital assistant. It enabled 
people to organize all their data on a computer, and then sync it to the device.
  
32 Before being acquired 
by Palm, Handspring introduced the Treo 180, which merged the Palm with a cell phone in 2002.
33 The 
Treo 180 retailed for $399 and was available with either a built-in keyboard or “Graffiti” based 
handwriting software. The Treo was offered by both Cingular and VoiceStream,
34  which was later 
acquired by T-Mobile. The Treo 180 was highly praised upon its introduction. Walter Mossberg of the 
Wall Street Journal called the Treo 180 “the best combination of a phone and personal digital assistant 
by far.”
35
Thin phones. In 2004, Motorola’s Razr revolutionized the cell phone industry once again by 
shifting the focus from handset features to phone size.
 But users quickly tired of being tethered to a computer, as they increasingly kept their data in 
multiple locations. They also were longing for a device that was more convenient to carry, which led to 
the next innovation. 
36 Motorola recognized the need for simplicity 
when it developed the Razr.
37  Initially conceived as an “iconic, image-leading, low-sales-volume” 
product, the Razr exceeded expectations with sales topping the company’s total lifetime projections just 
three months after its August 2004 release.
38 Roger Jellicoe, manager of the Razr development project, 
recognized the phone’s potential and knew that it could “change the industry.”
39 He insisted that “once 
you picked up the Razr and used it, you never wanted another phone.”
40
The Razr became the top-selling phone in the United States in 2005 and held that position until 
the third quarter of 2008, when the iPhone 3G took the lead.
  
41 Motorola’s profits, however, began to 
slide well before the Razr was overturned as the most popular phone.
42
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plummeted and new models did little to boost revenue, as Motorola struggled to sell its high-end 
phones. The revenues of Motorola’s mobile-device division declined by over one third in 2007.
43 In that 
same quarter, Motorola Inc. posted a 94 percent decline in net profit.
44
Smartphones. The next revolution in handsets connected  personal digital assistants to the 
Internet. In May 2009, Morgan Stanley Research described the migration to Internet-connected mobile 




Smartphones have been around for more than a decade. Yet of the billion-plus mobile phones 
operating throughout the world, only ten percent are estimated to be smartphones, suggesting   
tremendous growth potential.
 “Smartphones” are cell phones that have many features of a desktop computer and are 
connected to the Internet. In addition to allowing people to make calls and check e-mail, smartphones 
can run programs or “apps” designed by third-party developers.  
46 Gartner Research estimates that sales of smartphones will increase by 
over 27  percent in 2009 to approximately  170  million units.
47  Morgan Stanley Research predicts 
smartphones will account for nearly half of all mobile phones in the near future.
48
In 2005, Nokia launched the N series, a new line that combined a web browser, video, music and 
pictures into a single phone. According to analysts (who evidently could not see Blackberry or the 
iPhone on the horizon), the devices moved Nokia a generation ahead in the race to build the first real 
smartphone.
 
49 But it was Research in Motion (RIM) and not Nokia that pioneered the smartphone 
segment. Although RIM’s Blackberry was not the first wireless device with reliable e-mail access, it 
popularized mobile e-mail among business professionals because of its integration with Microsoft 
Exchange servers and strong encryption. “Push” e-mail alerted users whenever they received a new e-
mail without having to continually check the server. Large corporations adopted the device en masse; 
for example, in February 2000, RIM announced a deal with Solomon Smith Barney to supply thousands 
of devices to its employees.
50 By December 2000, RIM had at least 115,000 Blackberry subscribers,
51 and 
by March 2001, RIM had at least 400,000, 70 percent of whom were connected through their corporate 
servers.
52
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Rival handset makers were trying to topple BlackBerry in the smartphone segment, but with less 
success.  In 2001, Kyocera introduced the Kyocera 6035.
 In 2002, RIM introduced the Blackberry 5810, which combined the Blackberry’s e-mail 
capabilities with wireless voice functionality.  
54  The Kyocera 6035 was the first widely 
available  smartphone with a Palm operating system.
55  It was described as “the first really good 
[personal-digital-assistant]-equipped phone” by Walter Mossberg.
56 In 2002, Danger, Inc. in conjunction 
with T-Mobile introduced the T-Mobile Sidekick.
57 The Sidekick was hailed as a “breakthrough wireless 
device” because it was the first device to offer user friendly e-mail, web surfing, and instant messaging 
at a price affordable to consumers rather than business people.
58 The device originally retailed at $199 
after a rebate with unlimited data use for $39.99.
59
The next major  upheaval within the smartphone segment  was launched by Apple in 2007. 
Where the BlackBerry succeeded among corporate users, the iPhone succeeded among mass-market 
users. Smartphone productivity features of the iPhone included email, text messaging, web browsing, 
contacts, a calendar, and a notepad. The iPhone also came equipped with a built-in camera and a voice 
recorder. It had the capability to operate on a 3G or Wi-Fi network,
 
60
Despite iPhone’s many impressive features that made it so popular with consumers, businesses 
were initially disappointed that the phone lacked the feature that made the BlackBerry so popular: push 
e-mail.
 which allowed users to download 
data at relatively high speeds. The iPhone also had the capability to sync emails, contacts and calendars 
wirelessly and has a search feature for users to find items in its standard applications.  
61  The second generation iPhone, released in June  2008, added GPS, high-speed 3G cellular 
network access, and push e-mail, along with security features to lure businesses.
62 Another key feature 
of the iPhone was the wide range of applications available for download both over the air and through 
the iTunes application for personal computers; as of August 2009, there were about 65,000 available.
63
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57.  Sacco, supra; Walter S. Mossberg, Phone, E-mail—Even Camera—in a $199 Device, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
Aug. 8, 2002. 
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incentivizing innovation and expanding the capabilities of the device. These applications range from 
video games to a Microsoft Office document reader. 
  A feature of the iPhone that received a great deal of attention was its touch-screen interface. 
Unlike many rival devices, the iPhone did not have a physical keyboard, relying instead on a touch-
screen keyboard that appears on its display when prompted to by the user. Users scroll through pages 
with the flick of a finger, and can zoom into and out of pages with two-finger pinching motions. Walter 
Mossberg and Katherine Boehret of the Wall Street Journal described this touch-screen interface as 
“effective, practical, and fun.”
64
By January 2009, more than 21 million iPhones had been sold.
 
65 As of July 2008, there were 
more than one billion downloads from the App Store since its launch.
66 As of May 2009, Morgan Stanley 
estimated that the iPhone accounted for 15 percent of global smartphone sales and 2 percent of all 
mobile devices.
67 Morgan Stanley predicted that iPhone’s share of the smartphone sales would reach 17 
percent by the end of 2010.
68 Despite these seemingly modest shares, the iPhone’s popularity—and its 
exclusive agreement with AT&T—caught the attention of regulators.
69
The Palm Pre hopes to become the next iconic phone within the smartphone category. The Palm 
Pre launched June 6, 2009 for $199 at Sprint stores.
  
70 The Palm team is staffed with former Apple 
employees and is led by Palm president Jon Rubinstein, who built the original iPod for Steve Jobs (based 




  Analysts recognized that a  wireless  user’s e-mail, pictures, video, and 
/LinkedIn/Twitter contacts were increasingly hard to manage, even on the sleek iPhone. Pre’s 
operating system, WebOS, claims to wirelessly combine all of those data into one comprehensive 
contact list, without duplicates.
72
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69.  See Section II, infra.  
70.  In September 2009, Palm  announced it was cutting the Pre’s price to $149 with a two-year service 
agreement with provider Sprint Nextel Corp. and after a $150 instant rebate and a $100 mail-in rebate. The price 
decrease brought the Pre closer to the iPhone, which sold for $99. See Yukari Iwatani Kane & Roger Cheng, Palm 
Unveils Pixi Smart Phone, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2009. 
71.  Josh Quittner, The Well; Technology Smart Phones The Plot to Take On The iPhone, TIME, June 15, 2009. 
72.  Id. Page | 10 
 
Competition in the mobile handset market continues to be fierce. Two days after the Pre’s 
launch, Apple unveiled a newer version of its iPhone, the iPhone 3Gs. The updated model is up to twice 
as fast as the iPhone 3G and features a longer battery life. Other improvements include the ability to 
record video, a 3 megapixel autofocus camera, and hands free voice control.
73 Finally, smartphones do 
not constitute the “last” category of the next new thing in handsets. Computer makers have shrunk the 
size of laptops down to eleven  inches  or smaller, creating a new class of mobile devices called 
“netbooks” or “minis,” which have been optimized for mobility and sell for under $500. An even faster 
version of the netbook called “ultrathins,” which are priced between $500 and $900 and weigh under 
five pounds, were introduced in 2009.
74 According to IDC Research, netbook sales are expected to more 
than double in 2009, from 11.6 million units in 2008 to 26.5 million in 2009.
75
B.  Market dynamics: share changes among handset makers around the introduction of 
the iconic device 
 When these devices are 
equipped with wireless chips (along with a mobile data plan), they become substitutes for smartphones. 
With major innovations in the mobile handset segment in the wireless industry coming from a 
number of different firms, we would expect to see changes in market share over time and the absence 
of a clear, dominant firm that controls access to well over half of all customers.
76
  1.  Smartphone Segment 
 Based on analysis of 
the data below, we conclude that no firm, including Apple,  had  a dominant share of the handset 
market—either in the United States or globally—over our study period (2005 to 2009), and that shares 
are not stable over time due to innovations among new handset makers.   
Market shares for smartphone sales in the United States are tracked by NPD Group, which 
estimated that in the first quarter of 2009,  RIM’s BlackBerry Curve moved  past Apple’s iPhone to 
become the best-selling consumer smartphone in the United States.
77 NPD Group estimated that RIM’s 
share of smartphone sales in the United States increased to nearly 50 percent in 2009, while Apple’s and 
Palm’s share of that segment both declined 10 percent each.
78 Other estimates place RIM’s share of the 
U.S. smartphone segment at slightly over 50 percent,  well ahead of Apple.
79
                                                           
73.  Apple Press Release, Apple Announces the New iPhone 3GS—The Fastest, Most Powerful iPhone Yet, Jun. 
8, 2009, available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/06/08iphone.html. 
  Apple is similarly not 
dominant in the global market for smartphone sales. Table 2 shows that Apple accounted for less than 
eleven percent of global smartphone sales as of the first quarter of 2009. Indeed, Nokia, the market 
leader, controlled less than half of the smartphone segment—far short of dominance—over the period 
studied.  
74.  Brandon Bailey, Makers hope new 'ultrathin' notebooks fill a niche, Phil. Inquirier, Sept. 16, 2009, 
available at http://www.philly.com/philly/business/technology/091609_ultra_thin_notebooks.html.    
75.  Id. 
76.  Antitrust courts have considered market shares above 60 percent to be dominant. See, e.g., United States 
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“a share significantly larger than 55% has been required to 
establish prima facie market power”). Although the threshold varies across circuits, the requisite share for 
determining dominance appears to be above 50 percent. 
77.  NPD Group, RIM Unseats Apple in The NPD Group's Latest Smartphone Ranking, available at 
http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_090504.html.  
78.  Id. 
79.  Jessi Hempel, How Blackberry Does It, FORTUNE, Aug. 31, 2009 (citing IDC data).  Page | 11 
 
TABLE 2: WORLDWIDE SMARTPHONE SHARE (BASED ON UNITS SOLD), 2005-09 









Share (%) *** 
Nokia  41.2  45.1  46.7  42.0  9.9 
RIM  19.9  13.3  8.3  6.5  20.8 
Motorola  *  *  *  5.3  * 
Palm  *  *  *  5.0  18.0 
HP  *  *  *  *  17.6 
Dell  *  *  *  *  6.3 
Apple  10.8  5.3  0.0  *  * 
Sharp/HTC  5.4  4.0  7.0  *  * 
Fujitsu  3.8  4.1  5.0  *  * 
Others**  18.9  28.2  33.0  41.2  27.3 
Total  100  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Note: * Less than three percent share. ** Incorporates the shares of carriers with less than three percent share. 
*** Personal digital assistant share only. 
Source: 1Q08 and 1Q09 market shares available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=985912; 1Q07 market 
shares  available at  http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=688116;  1Q06 market share available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=496997; 1Q05 market share available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=492135. 
As Table 2 shows, the global  shares of smartphone makers are not stable over time. For 
example, Apple suddenly emerges on the list of leading smartphone suppliers in 2008; while other 
manufacturers, such as Palm and Motorola, disappear. The only exception to this rule is Nokia, which 
has maintained a steady share between 40 and 45 percent over the time period analyzed. To 
understand what drove these shifts in market share, in what follows, we briefly summarize the major 
developments in the smartphone segment since 2005. As our discussion makes clear, share shifts are 
largely driven by the continuous introduction of the next, iconic phone. 
By  the first quarter of 2005, personal digital assistants with integrated wireless local area 
network or cellular capabilities accounted for approximately 55 percent of all personal digital assistants 
shipped.
80 RIM was the leading supplier of personal digital assistants shipments. Palm’s personal digital 
assistants shipments declined significantly; its market share in the personal-digital-assistant segment fell 
from 30.5 to 18 percent, its lowest market share since it entered the personal-digital-assistant segment 
in 1996.
81 Nokia’s re-entry into the personal-digital-assistant segment with its 9300 and 9500 models 
enabled Nokia to gain a significant foothold.
82
In the first quarter of 2006, Nokia accounted for 42 percent of the combined personal-digital-
assistant and smartphone segment.
 
83
                                                           
80.  Gartner Says Wireless E-Mail Applications Drive Worldwide PDA Shipments Increase 25 Percent in First 
Quarter of 2005, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=492135.  
 Motorola smartphone shipments roughly doubled in the first half 
of 2006, driven by the success of Motorola’s Linux-based devices in China. Gartner presciently noted 
that Motorola was “not making significant progress with its Microsoft and Symbian-based smartphones 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Nokia’s share in 2006 is not directly comparable with its share in 2005 because Gartner changed the 
category from personal digital assistants only in 2005 to “Combined smartphones and personal digital assistants” 
in 2006.  Page | 12 
 
and shipments of the Motorola Q have been hampered by the minimum $80 monthly service plan 
offered by Verizon.”
84  RIM  enjoyed an increase in sales of 60 percent year-on-year, lifted by the 
newfound popularity of the Blackberry. Palm experienced a sales decrease of 26 percent in the first half 
of 2006, as “the company shifted its focus on sales of its Treo smartphones.”
85
In the first quarter of 2007, Palm and Motorola disappeared from the Gartner survey of the 
leading providers of smartphones. In the first quarter of 2008, Nokia still enjoyed 45 percent of the 
global smartphone segment; Gartner credits Nokia’s success to the “variety of its smartphone portfolio, 
which includes a number of both high-end and mid-tier models available at different price points.”
  
86
In the first two  quarters  of 2009, Nokia  managed  to  increase  its sales in the smartphone 
segment by introducing the Nokia 5800 into more regions.
 RIM 
saw its share double from 2006, driven by sales of the BlackBerry Curve and Pearl. Seemingly out of 
nowhere, Apple became the third largest provider of smartphones with a 5.3 percent share, thanks to 
the introduction of the iPhone.  
87  Nokia’s  N97 smartphone “met little 
enthusiasm at its launch in the second quarter of 2009.”
88 Apple’s iPhone 3G S sold 1 million units in its 
first weekend; its sales were also boosted by Apple’s expansion into a larger number of countries and its 
price adjustments on the 8GB 3G iPhone.
89 RIM continued to grow its share, while HTC lowered its 
expectations for the second half of 2009 due to product delays.
90
  2.  Other Segments of the Handset Market 
  
Radical shifts also occurred in the non-smartphone segment of the handset market over the 
same time period. As in the smartphone segment, Nokia was the industry leader, yet its share was 
below 40 percent from 2005 through 2009. Table 3 shows shares for what Gartner calls the “mobile 
terminal sales to end users,” which includes smartphone sales (smartphone sales accounted for 13.5 
percent of all handset sales in the first quarter of 2009), but also includes simpler phones that focus on 
telephony and text messaging.  
                                                           
84.   Gartner Says Worldwide Combined PDA and Smartphone Shipments Market Grew 57 Percent in the First 
Half of 2006, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=496997. 
85.   Id. 
86.  Gartner Says Worldwide Smartphone Sales Grew 29 Percent in First Quarter of 2008, available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=688116.  
87.  Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Declined 8.6 Per Cent and Smartphones Grew 12.7 Per Cent 
in First Quarter of 2009, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=985912.  
88.  Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Declined 6 Per Cent and Smartphones Grew 27 Per Cent in 
Second Quarter of 2009, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1126812. 
89.  Id. 
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TABLE 3: WORLDWIDE MOBILE TERMINAL SHARE (BASED ON UNITS SOLD), 2005-09 










Nokia  36.2  39.1  35.7  34.0  30.4 
Samsung  19.1  14.4  12.5  12.5  13.5 
LG  9.9  8.0  6.2  6.5  6.3 
Motorola  6.2  10.2  18.5  20.3  16.7 
Sony Ericsson  5.4  7.5  8.4  6.1  5.5 
BenQMobile  *  *  *  3.5  5.7 
Others**  23.4  20.8  18.8  17.1  21.9 
Total  100  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Note: * Less than three percent share. ** Incorporates the shares of carriers with less than three percent share. 
Sources: Data from 2008 and 2009 from Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Declined 8.6 Per Cent and 
Smartphones Grew 12.7 Per Cent in First Quarter of 2009, available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=985912; data from 2007 from Gartner Says Strong Results in Asia/Pacific 
and Japan Drove Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales to 14 Percent Growth in the First Quarter of 2007, available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=506573; data from 2006 and 2005 from Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile 
Phone Sales in First Quarter are Indicative of Another Strong Year in 2006,  available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=492896.  
 
Table 3 reveals that some carriers, such as BenQMobile, disappeared from the rankings entirely in 2007 
after commanding over five percent of worldwide handset sales in 2005. It also shows that others, such 
as LG, realized a share increase of five percent in one year from 2008 to 2009. This rapidly changing 
marketplace landscape is not consistent with the notion of dominance. 
To better understand what drove these and other radical shifts in market share, we summarize 
the major developments in the larger handset market, which includes smartphones (described above) 
and other types of handsets. Our brief history begins in the early 1990s. Once again, share shifts are 
frequently driven by the introduction of iconic handsets. 
Motorola’s (relatively) small MicroTAC, introduced in 1989, allowed it to distance itself from 
rival device makers.
91 By the middle of the 1990s, however, Nokia (with the introduction of the 9000 
Communicator)  and Ericsson took  about  five  percentage points from Motorola’s  share, causing 
Motorola’s share to fall from 65 to 60 percent.
92  Nokia and Samsung took additional share from 
Motorola over the subsequent decade, leaving Motorola with less than 20 percent by the middle of the 
decade. The Nokia 6100 series, introduced in November 1997, featured extended battery life, games, 
and dual-mode, and digital-wireless technology.
93
                                                           
91.  Howard Wolinsky, Cell Phones Keep Ringing Up Sales, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at 39. 
 The Samsung SCH-1000 made Sprint PCS the “first 
CDMA carrier to offer wireless consumers a choice of phones” in 1997. The phone was the lightest 
92.  Id. 
93.  Nokia Introduces Next Generation Product Family For GSM, BUSINESS WIRE, Nov. 11, 1997. Page | 14 
 
CDMA phone at the time.
94
In 2006, Nokia and Motorola accounted for over half of worldwide mobile phone sales.
 Motorola’s slide was reversed with the introduction of the popular and 
iconic Razr in 2004. 
95 Led by 
its wideband-code-division-multiple-access phones, Nokia was the preferred brand in Western Europe, 
Central Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
96 Motorola faced increasing competition in the 
supply of thin phones.
97 Samsung fell further behind Motorola.
98  In 2007, Nokia’s continued strong 
sales were driven by its multimedia-rich phones;
99 it introduced the 5200 and 5300 in the end of 2006, 
and it introduced the Nokia 6300 in 2007.
100 Nokia sold close to 1 million Eseries devices to business 
customers.
101 It was on the verge of launching the 2630 and the Navigator.
102 Motorola lost nearly 2 
percentage points of market share; it  introduced  the Razr2 with the hope of stimulating sales.
103 
Samsung’s market share remained unchanged relative to 2006, as it focused on “rich features and ultra 
slim design.”
104 Sony Ericsson enjoyed modest share growth driven by both high-end models (K800 and 
W880) as well as the low and mid-tier products (W300, W200, and the K310).
105 LG also enjoyed share 
growth via the introduction of the LG Prada as well as new colors of the K800 Chocolate phone.
106
In 2008, Nokia maintained its market leadership due in part to strong sales in the ultra-low-cost 
segment.
  
107 Samsung surpassed Motorola in sales by focusing on touch-screen devices.
108 LG overtook 
Sony Ericsson to become the fourth-largest handset vendor, in part by focusing on touch-screen devices 
similar to the iPhone,
109 including the LG Prada, Shine, and KF600. Sony Ericsson blamed its weak results 
on difficult conditions in the Western European market, which led to a weakening in the demand for 
high-end phones.
110
                                                           
94.    Sprint PCS Announces Availability of Samsung Phone; Samsung Phone Becomes Second Phone Option for 
Sprint PCS Customers, BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 21, 1997. 
  
95.    Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales in First Quarter are Indicative of Another Strong Year in 
2006, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=492896   
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Gartner Says Strong Results in Asia/Pacific and Japan Drove Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales to 14 
Percent Growth in the First Quarter of 2007, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=506573.  
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Increased 14 Per Cent in First Quarter of 2008, available at 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=680207.  
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
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In 2009, certain handset makers once again experienced significant share shifts. Relative to the 
first quarter of 2008, Motorola lost four percentage points in its market share by the first quarter of 
2009 (from 10.2 to 6.2 percent); Samsung saw its share increase by five percentage points (from 14.4 to 
19.1 percent), driven by the introduction of the Omnia, Tocco and Pixon touch-screen handsets.
111
II.   What makes the iPhone special yet not a must-have input for wireless carriers? 
 
Motorola appears not to have found a successor to its “once-dominant” Razr. 
  Economists are concerned about exclusive contracts between an upstream input provider and a 
downstream distributor if the excluded input is needed by a distributor’s rivals to effectively compete. 
Inputs that are deemed essential to preserve downstream competition are called must-have inputs.
112 
Although there are a few prominent examples,
113 it is hard to conceive of must-have inputs in the 
telecommunications industry. Must-have inputs are likely to be especially rare in technology markets 
where rapid innovation causes once “dominant” inputs to be dated in a short period of time. By limiting 
access to must-have inputs, the distributor may  impair competition in one of three ways: (1) 
discouraging entry, (2) encouraging exit, or (3) raising a rival’s operating costs.
114 Consistent with the 
economic view of exclusive dealing, courts have also focused on whether an input is “essential” or must-
have in assessing the merits of cases involving exclusionary conduct.
115
                                                           
111.  Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales Declined 8.6 Per Cent and Smartphones Grew 12.7 Per 
Cent in First Quarter of 2009, available at http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=985912.  
  In this section, we analyze 
112.   Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure (reprinted in III HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 
Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter, eds., 2145-2220, 2007), at *1 (“An input produced by a dominant firm is essential if 
it cannot be cheaply duplicated by users who are denied access to it.”). 
113.  For example, the Federal Communications Commission has determined that the television rights to a 
professional sports team that has been granted an exclusive (regional) territory by a league constitute a must-have 
input for competitive distributors of video programming. See, e.g., In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the 
Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, MB Dkt. No. 05-192, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
released July 21, 2006, FCC 06-105, ¶ 124 (finding that a video distributor’s “ability to gain access to [regional 
sports networks] and the price and other terms [or] conditions of access can be important factors in its ability to 
compete with [the distributor’s] rivals.”).  
114.  Rey & Tirole, supra, at 8 (”[W]e will define foreclosure as a situation in which: (i) a firm dominants one 
market (bottleneck good); and (ii) it uses its market power in the bottleneck good market to restrict output in 
another market, perhaps but not necessarily by discouraging the entry or encouraging the exit of rivals.”); see also 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over 
Price, 96 YALE L. J. 234 (1986) ( “The simplest and most obvious method by which foreclosure of supply can raise 
rivals' costs is that purchaser's obtaining exclusionary rights from all (or a sufficient number of) the lowest-cost 
suppliers, where those suppliers determine the input's market price. Competitors of the purchaser experience a 
cost increase as they necessarily shift to higher cost suppliers or less efficient inputs. Antitrust literati know this as 
the 'Bottleneck' or 'essential facilities' problem.”). 
115.  See e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-133 (7th Circ. 1983) (In MCI the 7th 
Circuit stated that plaintiff must prove “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's 
inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a 
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.”). This general focus on ensuring that rivals maintain the 
ability to constrain dominant firms’ prices is also at the heart of the Federal Communication Commission’s 
regulation of affiliated cable programming.  See  47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3).  Section 616 orders the Federal 
Communications Commission to promulgate rules that “contain provisions designed to prevent a multichannel 
video programming distributor from engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably restrain the ability 
of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly by discriminating in video programming distribution Page | 16 
 
whether the iPhone would satisfy this must-have criterion that the law and economics recognizes as 
being necessary to justify intervention. 
  A.  Identifying the key attributes of the iPhone 
  The iPhone has attracted significant attention since its debut in the summer of 2007, when it 
drew long lines of fanatical followers who waited for days in front of Apple retail stores and created a 
scene that was “Part street theater, part ‘iPhone slumber party.’”
116
1.  As with the iPod, the iPhone syncs easily with Apple’s popular iTunes software.  
 As described above, there are many 
features of the device that make it an attractive product. Based on analyst reviews, we have identified 
the following seven features as being the most important attributes:  
2.  It supports thousands of applications via its App Store. 
3.  The iPhone’s touch-screen interface features “multi-touch” capabilities. 
4.  It supports video streaming of media files.  
5.  It runs over a super-fast 3G data network. 
6.  The built-in camera allows users to upload images to sites like Facebook. 
7.  It includes a GPS chipset that allows users to pinpoint their exact geographic locations. 
While there are myriad other features available on the iPhone, these seven appear to be the ones that 
set the iPhone apart from the pack upon its introduction. The key question for regulators is: Can wireless 
operators, including rural operators,
117
B.  Are those attributes currently offered by rival smartphones—and if not, will they soon 
be replicated or superseded? 
 compete effectively in the downstream wireless services market 
without access to the iPhone and its key features? 
Based on a review of available handsets in August 2009, we conclude that several competing 
mobile devices replicate the key features of the iPhone. Table 4 offers a comparison of smartphones 
that compete with the iPhone, noting which iPhone features are currently  replicated  or could be 
replicated in the near future. Almost all of the iPhone’s fundamental attributes are available in rival 
smartphones. The basic features of email, web browsing, contacts, and calendars are standard.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on the basis of affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors in the selection, terms, or conditions for carriage of video 
programming provided by such vendors.” 
116
.  C.W. Nevius, Wait Worth It, But Unnecessary,
 SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jun. 30, 2007. 
117.  See Rural Cellular Association, Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Exclusivity Arrangements between 
Commercial Wireless Carriers and Handset Manufacturers, May 20, 2008. Page | 17 
 
TABLE 4: KEY ATTRIBUTES OF THE IPHONE 













(2) Supports tens of 
thousands of applications 
Not Yet





























Source: 1. Philip Elmer-DeWitt,  Scooplet: the Palm Pre syncs with iTunes,  CNN  MONEY.COM, May 28, 2009, available at 
http://brainstormtech.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2009/05. The only exception is that the Pre cannot handle old, copy-protected (DRM protected) 
songs. 2. Paul Taylor, BlackBerry's New Squeeze; The Storm Smartphone Introduces a Responsive 'Virtual' Keyboard that is Likely to Appeal to 
Heavy E-mail Users, FINANCIAL TIMES, November 21, 2008, at 14. 3. Nokia Multimedia Transfer. https://www.nokiausa.com/get-support-and-
software/software/nokia-multimedia-transfer. 4. Richard Wray, INQ Reveals Handsets with Twitter and iTunes Sync Built In, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, 
August 4, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/aug/04/inq-phone-twitter-itunes-doubletwist. 5. Pre Features: 
http://www.palm.com/us/products/phones/pre/.  6. BlackBerry App World.  7. Ovi Applications: https://store.ovi.com/.  8. G1 Applications: 
http://www.android.com/market/.  9. Pre Streaming: http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2338583,00.asp.  10. Storm Features: 
http://na.blackberry.com/eng/devices/blackberrystorm/storm_features.jsp.  11. N97 Features: http://www.nokiausa.com/find-
products/phones/nokia-n97/features.  12. Storm Streaming: http://blogs.zdnet.com/Apple/?p=2527.  13. G1 Features: 
http://www.htc.com/us/product/g1/overview.html 
The first row of Table  4  shows  that  these competing smartphones are also capable of 
synchronizing with iTunes, albeit sometimes through a third-party program (as is the case with the HTC 
G1).
118 RIM and Nokia have offered their own software which reads the iTunes XML library file and syncs 
to their devices. In contrast, the Palm Pre identifies itself to a PC as an iPod and syncs with iTunes 
directly instead of through a 3rd party software. Although Apple temporarily disabled the Palm Pre’s 
ability to sync directly with iTunes through an update to the music software, Palm has pushed back 
against Apple by updating the Pre’s software so that it once again can sync with iTunes.
119
There are a few differences between the iPhone and its rivals. While competing smartphones 
include touch screens, the iPhone goes a step further in offering a multi-touch interface that is relatively 
unique among its peers. The Pre does include multi-touch features like the ability to zoom with the use 
of two fingers, but the status of these features are uncertain because Apple has been granted patents 
covering specific multi-touch capabilities used in the iPhone.
 Moreover, 
touch-screen functionality (row 3) and the ability to stream video (row 4) and access data at fast speeds 
via 3G networks (row 5) are also provided by iPhone’s rivals. Digital cameras (row 6) and GPO chipsets 
(row 7) are standard with these iPhone alternatives. 
120
                                                           
118.  The G1 can synchronize with iTunes  through a program called DoubleTwist. See Richard Wray, INQ 
Reveals Handsets with Twitter and iTunes Sync Built In,  GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Aug. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/aug/04/inq-phone-twitter-itunes-doubletwist. 
 Another difference between the iPhone 
and competing products is the selection of third-party applications available for the device. As of August 
2009, the iPhone’s App Store has many more additional software choices than do other devices. 
However, this differential should narrow over time. Google’s Android platform, which is used in the HTC 
119.  Jenna Wortham, Rivalry Between Apple and Palm Intensifies, NEW YORK TIMES, August 3, 2009, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/technology/companies/04palm.html. 
120.  Rachel Metz, Apple Disables iTunes sync feature on Palm Pre, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jul. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gO4hyk2k4CHsa4p1yIhqRAH7gD1gD99FGNA82 Page | 18 
 
G1, already has thousands of third-party applications, and tens of thousands of developers have 
downloaded the software development kit for the Palm Pre.
121
In summary, there is a lot of competition for the smartphone segment and several smartphones 
offer similar features to the iPhone. The competition among handset makers is not only leading to 
innovative designs, but it is also ensuring that the price for smartphones has declined to levels that 
many Americans can afford. Apple dropped the price of its first generation iPhone to $99 in 2009 (upon 
the introduction of the iPhone 3GS), and Palm reduced the price of its Pre shortly after its initial 
introduction. It seems quite plausible, based on the history of innovation in this area, that a new, iconic 
phone will emerge that supplants Apple’s iPhone.  
 Although the iPhone had a head start in 
the “application wars,” its advantage is not likely to last, as it seems largely due to being introduced first, 
rather than some intrinsically better functionality. 
C.  Even the best device makers, including Apple, stumble at times 
Through the introduction of the iconic Blackberry, RIM has proven itself to be a leader in the 
handset industry. Expectations were high when RIM in November 2008 introduced a touch-screen 
smartphone, the Blackberry Storm, to compete  with the iPhone. But the Storm has proven to be 
somewhat of a disappointment. Some proponents of regulatory intervention in the handset market 
have seized on RIM’s initial stumble as evidence of Apple’s dominance. 
The Storm received many reviews that were critical. Upon the Storm’s release, Yardena Arar of 
PC World declared, “the Storm’s touch interface feels like a failed experiment.”
122 David Pogue, an 
acclaimed technology reviewer for the New York Times, offered harsher criticism, calling the Storm the 
“BlackBerry Dud,” and claiming that he “[hadn’t] found a soul who tried this machine who wasn’t 
appalled, baffled or both.”
123 A review in Information Week was severely critical of the Storm’s keypad: 
“The full QWERTY is spacious, and gives your thumbs plenty of room, but my thumbs felt real fatigue 
after typing out a 100-word e-mail.”
124
                                                           
121.  Jeffrey Schwartz, Developers Gather at Palm Pre Dev Camps, APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT TRENDS MAGAZINE, 
Aug.  11, 2009, available at  http://adtmag.com/articles/2009/08/11/developers-gather-at-palm-pre-dev-
camps.aspx. 
 The reviewer went on to note that the Storm was not responsive 
to rotations of the phone; the phone would randomly switch from vertical to horizontal orientation even 
though the phone had not been rotated at all; and the camera software and video playback software 
both crashed the phone completely several times, requiring the reviewer to pull the battery to reset the 
122.  Yardena Arar, RIM’s BlackBerry Storm: Awkward and Disappointing, PC WORLD, Nov. 20, 2008, available 
at http://www.pcworld.com/article/154212/rims_blackberry_storm_awkward_and_disappointing.html. 
123.  David Pogue, No Keyboard? And You Call this a BlackBerry?, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/technology/personaltech/27pogue.html. 
124.  Eric Zeman, Review: Touch-Screen BlackBerry Storm Gets Mixed Verdict, InformationWeek, Nov. 24, 
2008,  available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal_tech/smartphones/showArticle.jhtml?articleID= 
212101426&pgno=1&queryText=&isPrev=. Page | 19 
 
Storm.
125 Despite such reviews, the Storm sold over one million units between November 2008 and July 
2009.
126
Some might conclude that RIM’s failure to produce a device that could successfully rival the 
iPhone proves the iPhone’s must-have nature. But the fact that the Storm was a disappointment does 
not mean that the iPhone’s market position is permanent. Innovation is a continuous process. 
Blackberry will likely learn from its successes and failures. There is too much at stake. Indeed, RIM and 
Verizon are introducing the Storm 2 for the holiday season in 2009, which is expected to have better 
hardware, a better touch-screen input method, and Wi-Fi access.
 
127 And the new Blackberry Tour, which 
is a smartphone that returns the traditional trackball and the elevated keyboard, has received glowing 
reviews.
128
On the subject of disappointing initial debuts, it is worth noting Apple stumbled in its initial 
attempt to deliver a commercially successful cell phone that integrated with iTunes. In 2005, Apple 
partnered with Motorola and Cingular (now AT&T) to produce the ROKR, a cell phone designed by 
Motorola that synchronized with iTunes and could play music like an iPod.
 
129 Much like the Blackberry 
Storm, this phone had significant deficiencies that hindered its commercial prospects. The ROKR could 
carry only 100 songs, regardless of the amount of memory included on the device, lacked the intuitive 
controls of an iPod, and took roughly an hour to transfer a complete set of songs from one’s computer 
to the device.
130 Despite this initial stumble, Apple was able to turn around and release the iPhone 
within two years, which has proved to be a great success.
131
III.  The role of exclusive agreements in promoting innovation in the handset market 
  Thus, we should not assume that 
competitors will be unable to match or beat the capabilities of the iPhone simply because they stumble 
once or twice. The competitive environment can change quickly in the world of handsets.  
Table 1 reveals that exclusive distribution agreements are often used in the handset industry. In 
2002, T-Mobile was the exclusive distributor of Danger’s Sidekick. Motorola’s iconic Razr V3 was 
exclusively offered by AT&T in 2004.
132
                                                           
125.  Id. 
 The Blackberry Pearl was introduced in 2006 under an exclusive 
126.   Marin Perez, Verizon Slashes BlackBerry Storm Price: RIM’s touchscreen Storm is now more competitive 
with the $100 Apple iPhone 3G from AT&T,  INFORMATIONWEEK, July 20, 2009, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/smart_phones/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=218501375. 
127.   Id. 
128.   See, e.g.,  Ryan Kellett, Review: The New Blackberry Tour, NPR, Aug. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2009/08/blackberry_1.html; Steve Ragan, Review: Verizon’s 
BlackBerry Tour 9630,  THE  TECH  HERALD, July 20, 2009, available at 
http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200929/4088/Review-Verizon-s-BlackBerry-Tour-9630. 
129.  Walter S. Mossberg, Music-Playing Cellphones Hit a Flat Note—We Test New iTunes Entry And Two 
Other Models; Reaching the 100-Song Limit,  WALL  STREET  JOURNAL, Sep.  14, 2005,  available at 
http://solution.allthingsd.com/20050914/music-cells-hit-flat-note/. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Apple similarly suffered losses when it replaced the Apple II with the Lisa. After almost falling into 
bankruptcy, it replaced the Lisa with the Mac, and the rest is history.  
132.  Roger O. Crockett, Daily Briefing, Cingular: Cool Phones Ring in a Merger; The Wireless Outfit Will 
Launch its New Life with AT&T Wireless with Exclusive Offers of Snazzy Handsets to Lure High-End Customers, 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2004. Page | 20 
 
contract with T-Mobile.
133 AT&T exclusively offered the Blackberry Curve in 2007.
134
The question to which we now turn is: Why do manufacturers and carriers enter into exclusive 
contracts in the first place? Before considering the benefits, we briefly discuss the costs of aligning with 
a single carrier from the perspective of a handset maker like Apple. By agreeing to an exclusive 
agreement with AT&T, Apple greatly reduced the number of consumers its iPhone would reach. At the 
time of Apple’s exclusive deal in 2007,
 More recently, 
AT&T was the exclusive distributor of the iPhone; Verizon was the exclusive distributor of the Storm; 
and Sprint was (at least through 2009) the exclusive distributor of the Palm Pre and the Kindle. The first 
Google phone powered by the Android operating system, the G1, is sold exclusively through T-Mobile; 
so is T-Mobile’s second generation Android phone.  
135
TABLE 5: ESTIMATED MARKET SHARES OF U.S. WIRELESS MARKET, MARCH 2009 
 AT&T had roughly a 30 percent share of the U.S. wireless 
market. Consequently, an exclusive agreement with AT&T meant that approximately 70 percent of 
wireless customers would be unable to use the iPhone on their existing network. Palm’s exclusive deal 
with Sprint regarding the Pre is even more curious, given Sprint’s roughly 11 percent market share in 
2009.  




Leap  Others 
Market share  31%  29%  12%  11%  3%  2%  2%  10% 
Sources:  Global Wireless Matrix 2Q09, Bank of America | Merrill Lynch Research, Jun. 25, 2009, Table 149; About 
U.S. Cellular, U.S. Cellular website, last accessed Aug. 20. 2009, available at 
http://www.uscc.com/uscellular/SilverStream/Pages/x_page.html?p=a_home. 
 
Table 5 shows that the market for U.S. wireless services is not highly concentrated. Indeed, Bank 
of America-Merrill Lynch estimates that concentration among wireless carriers is less than all but one of 
the 26 other countries in its survey.
136
While it is certainly possible to induce subscribers of rival networks to change networks and 
incur the associated switching costs, the majority of handset purchases made pursuant to an exclusive 
agreement are made by the exclusive carrier’s customers. For example, two-thirds of iPhone activations 
in the second quarter of 2009 were for existing AT&T customers.
 Given this lack of concentration, when a handset maker like Palm 
aligns itself with a single carrier like Sprint, the handset maker effectively cedes a share of potential sales 
(in this case, roughly 89 percent of U.S. wireless subscribers).  
137 Sales of the Palm Pre followed the 
same pattern: the CEO of Sprint claimed that initial sales for the Pre—an exclusive handset offered by 
Sprint—stemmed largely from Sprint’s existing base of customers.
138
                                                           
133.  T-Mobile USA and RIM Introduce the Ultra-Sleek BlackBerry Pearl, MARKET WIRE, Sept. 7, 2006. 
 Accordingly, from the handset 
maker’s perspective, the cost of entering into  an exclusive contract is likely to be economically 
134.  Joseph Palenchar, AT&T Throws a BlackBerry Curve, TWICE, May 30, 2007. 
135.  FCC’s Thirteenth CMRS Report, at A-4.  
136.  Global Wireless Matrix 2Q09, Bank of America | Merrill Lynch Research, Jun. 25, 2009.  
137.  One third of iPhone activations in the second quarter of 2009 were for customers new to AT&T. See 
Mobile and Wireless iPhone 3GS Launch was AT&T’s Best Day Ever, EWEEK, July 23, 2009. 
138.  Roger Cheng, Sprint’s Woes Continue Despite Palm Pre Debut, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 30, 2009, at 
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significant. Because handset makers would not enter into exclusives unless they were profitable, it must 
be the case that Palm’s expected gains from the transaction exceeded these significant costs. 
A.  Procompetitive motivations for exclusive handset contracts 
  So what motivates these exclusive contracts? Handset makers seek exclusive agreements with 
carriers, not as part of some anticompetitive scheme to foreclose the carrier’s downstream rivals, but to 
share the enormous risk associated with launching a new device, to align the incentives of the carrier 
with the handset maker, and to ensure network quality. Economic research has demonstrated that 
voluntary, exclusive contracts are often motivated for procompetitive reasons.
139
1.  Risk sharing  
 From the perspective 
of a handset maker like Apple, aligning with a single carrier like AT&T ensures that Apple does not incur 
all of the downside in the event that the phone flops. The agreement also ensures that AT&T will make 
iPhone-specific investments such as marketing support, handset subsidies, and modifying its network to 
accommodate the bandwidth-intensive applications. The network upgrades that AT&T had to make to 
support the iPhone suggests that the iPhone would not be immediately available to operate on other 
carriers’ networks that had not been similarly upgraded.   
Exclusive contracts may correct dealer-incentive issues that occur when the manufacturer wants 
the dealer to invest up front  in specific facilities or human capital to provide better service to 
consumers.
140 Applied here, handset manufacturers often require operators, as part of an exclusive 
agreement, to commit to investing in technical support for new handsets. But perhaps the largest 
commitment carriers make to the handset maker is to subsidize the cost of the handset so that it is 
more affordable to consumers. The (first-generation) iPhone models debuted unsubsidized by AT&T at 
$499 and $599.
141 AT&T subsidized the second-generation iPhone.
142 In particular, AT&T paid Apple 
$300 per 8 gigabyte iPhone 3G,
143 leaving AT&T’s customers the balance of $199 (equal to the $499 total 
price less the $300 subsidy).
144 Verizon pays RIM roughly $200
145 toward the $399 total price of the 
Storm, leaving its customers the balance of $199. Sprint pays Palm at least $340 for each Pre,
146
                                                           
139.   For a review of  the economic literature on the welfare effects of vertical restraints, see Francine 
Lafontaine, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy Advances in the 
Economics of Competition Law, June 2005. 
 leaving 
its customers a more reasonable charge of $199 after rebate.
 Even lower-end phones can draw $100 
140.   Lafontaine, supra, at 7. 
141.  Apple press release, Apple Sets iPhone Price at $399 for this Holiday Season, Sept. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/05iphone.html. 
142.  Arik Hesseldahl, Why AT&T May Deep-Discount The iPhone; with Competitive Pressures Mounting, The 
Phone Company May Cut The iPhone's Price to Boost Demand—and  Cement Its Relationship with Apple, 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, May 2, 2008. 
143.  Leslie Cauley, "We're all about wireless'"; AT&T's Stephenson's iPhone Deal with Apple Is Part of Global 
Strategy, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2008. 
144.  Jamie Lendino, Study: BlackBerry Storm Costs More to Build than iPhone, PCMAG.COM, Jan. 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2339876,00.asp. 
145.  Sara Silver, Apple, RIM Outsmart Phone Market, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jul. 20, 2009. 
146.  Sprint reports big rise in cell subsidies,  REUTERS, Aug. 4, 2009, available at 




Risk sharing is even more important in the supply of mobile handsets given the combination of 
the massive upfront costs of developing a new phone and the uncertainty of demand for the new 
product.  The  shortcomings  of the ROKR and the Storm highlight the demand uncertainty faced by 
handset makers; even the backing of a big carrier cannot guarantee success. With respect to the 
significance of the upfront costs, Apple reportedly incurred $150 million in developing the iPhone;
 Such subsidies are properly considered brand-specific commitments that are 
secured via the exclusive. Marketing support or promotion, which may also be considered a form of up-
front investment, is discussed below. 
148 
Palm incurred $393.8 million in research and development in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, leading up to 
the launch of the Pre.
149 Motorola invested an “unheard of” $20 million in research and development 
for its MicroTAC device that debuted in 1989.
150
2.  Marketing support 
 Handset makers appear to value having a partner that 
has access to a base of installed subscribers to share some of their R&D risk. Although the exclusive 
agreement impairs the handset maker’s access to large slices of the market (by virtue of each carrier’s 
limited market shares), the agreement  does give the handset maker assurance that at least some 
installed base of customers will likely purchase the new device. 
Exclusive contracts also  facilitate the coordination of marketing efforts between the 
downstream distributors and the upstream manufacturers of a product. In the absence of an exclusive 
agreement, downstream distributors will be hesitant to expend resources marketing a product because 
some of the benefits of marketing will accrue to downstream rivals. To make matters concrete, consider 
Verizon’s decision to market the Blackberry Storm if customers who see the advertisement choose to 
buy the Storm from a rival carrier. 
Because downstream distributors do not appropriate the entire benefit of their marketing 
expenditures, they will invest less in marketing. This problem is known as the “free-rider” problem in 
economics; rather than reap the benefits of their own marketing investments, firms will attempt to 
appropriate the benefits of their rivals’ marketing campaigns. Exclusive contracts between producers 
and distributors allow distributors to appropriate the entire benefit of their marketing expenditures. In 
some circumstances, exclusive contracts can induce downstream firms to invest in the optimal level of 
marketing.
151
                                                           
147.  Silver, supra. 
 This coordination of marketing efforts between the handset maker and the carrier also 
benefits consumers. As two prominent competition economists recently wrote, when firms are able to 
free-ride off the marketing expenditures of other firms, “competition between retailers is likely to 
generate an insufficient level of service from both the firms’ and the consumers’ point of view. Vertical 
148.  Testimony of Barbara S. Esbin, Senior Fellow and Director of the Progress and Freedom Foundation, 
before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee on the Consumer Wireless Experience, June 
17, 2009. 
149.  Palm, Inc., Form 10-K (Annual Report), Jul. 24, 2009, at 8. 
150.  Howard Wolinsky, Cell Phones Keep Ringing Up Sales, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at 39. 
151.   Frank Mathewson and Ralph Winter, An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND JOURNAL OF 
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restraints are thus likely to be socially desirable.”
152
Given the large investments AT&T has made in marketing the iPhone, there is no question that 
the exclusive contract between Apple and AT&T has benefitted both Apple and consumers. AT&T’s 2008 
Annual Shareholder Report suggests that its large outlays for advertising have been a significant factor in 
driving iPhone sales.
  Exclusive agreements are one type of vertical 
restraint that can correct the free-rider problem. 
153 AT&T attributed increased sales and advertising expenses of $572 million to 
“Apple iPhone related costs” for its 2007 fiscal year.
154
3.  Quality assurance and reputation 
 Expenditures of this magnitude would not have 
been likely in the absence of an exclusive agreement covering the iPhone. 
  Exclusive deals also  benefit upstream manufacturers and consumers by assuring product 
quality.
155 Specifically, exclusive dealing allows a manufacturer to closely monitor the distribution of its 
product  so  that the product does not  become associated with distributors who might harm the 
manufacturer’s brand.
156 This theory is particularly applicable to wireless handsets because the final 
handset product is necessarily tied to the network on which the handset is used. Thus, through an 
exclusive contract, a manufacturer like Apple can ensure that its handset is only used on a wireless 
network that can meet its exacting demands. AT&T invested an additional $2.5 billion in spectrum to 
accommodate the release of the iPhone 3GS.
157
B.  Why the critics of handset exclusivity are wrong 
  
Critics of exclusive contracts begin their analysis with a faulty premise—namely, that wireless 
carriers impose exclusivity provisions on handset manufacturers. Under the traditional paradigm of 
monopoly-leveraging, a carrier with excessive downstream market power would demand exclusivity (or 
even equity in the handset) as a condition of granting access to the carriers’ customers. Having secured 
exclusivity, the carrier would then deny the  must-have input to its rivals to distort downstream 
competition. A July 2009 letter to the Wall Street Journal by Hu Meena, President of Cellular South, 
argues that the nationwide carriers were seeking to impose exclusive contracts to increase their market 
power: “Now, as ‘kings of the jungle’ demand and get exclusive device deals to further increase their 
market share.”
158
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  But that story does not appear to apply here. A review of the circumstances 
surrounding the development of the iPhone reveals that the exclusivity agreement was the result of 
153.   AT&T Inc. Annual Report 2008, at 26 (“Contributing to our net additions and retail customer growth was 
improvement in postpaid customer turnover (customer churn) levels due to our strong network performance and 
attractive products and service offerings, including the Apple iPhone. The improvement in Churn levels benefited 
from network and customer service improvements and continued high levels of advertising.”) 
154.  Id. at 28. 
155.  Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 
358 (2002). 
156.  Rey & Tirole, supra, at 78. 
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Apple’s extremely aggressive negotiating strategy. As we demonstrate below, it is often the handset 
manufacturers, and not the carriers, who are seeking the exclusive agreements.     
For example, Apple viewed an exclusive contract with AT&T as a means to secure what has been 
described as an “unprecedented”
159 position in the development of a wireless handset. As part of this 
exclusive deal, Apple demanded that AT&T not place AT&T’s brand on the phone, that AT&T distribute 
to Apple a portion of its monthly subscriber revenues, that the iPhone would only be available at Apple 
or AT&T stores, and that Apple maintain sole discretion as to whether to repair or replace defective 
iPhones.
160 Apple also insisted that the iPhone’s development be completely secret. Apple only allowed 
three AT&T executives to see the phone prior to its release.
161 Verizon rejected this offer by Apple to 
make Verizon the exclusive distributor of the iPhone.
162
While the story of Palm’s exclusive with Sprint is less clear in terms of which party was seeking 
to impose the exclusivity, it certainly is not consistent with the suggestion that exclusives are motivated 
for anticompetitive reasons. With the Palm Pre, Sprint was hoping to start a long recovery, having lost 
two percent of its customers in the fourth quarter of 2008 and nearly another one percent through the 
second quarter of 2009.
 This anecdote makes clear that AT&T’s exclusive 
agreement with Apple was not a unilateral exercise of market power on the part of AT&T, but rather the 
result of hard bargaining on the part of Apple. 
163  Sprint CEO Dan Hesse called the Pre Sprint’s  “coming-out party,”
164 
demonstrating to customers Sprint’s reorganized customer service
165 and improved network.
166 Palm 
may have more to lose than Sprint.
167 Palm has been suffering for several years as its Palm OS and 
Windows Mobile-based phones have failed to take hold.
168 Palm reportedly teamed up with Sprint 
because it was a “comfortable”
169 fit—Palm has sold an increasing proportion of its devices through 
Sprint over the last three years.
170
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160.  Leslie Cauley, Verizon Rejected Apple iPhone Deal,  USA  TODAY, Jan. 29, 2007; Amol Sharma, Nick 
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2007. 
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down to a long term relationship that we continue to build.”
171 It is worth noting that duration of this 
exclusive agreement appears to be short-lived: Verizon announced at the end of May 2009 (before 
Sprint had even started selling the phone) that it too would offer the Pre by the beginning of 2010.
172
IV.  Other disruptive technologies on the horizon 
  
  Thus far, we have focused on competition for the supply of handsets. Because most consumers 
typically purchase a  bundle  of  products—a handset, an operating system,  and  wireless service  (as 
opposed to a standalone handset)—wireless carriers compete for consumers through the quality and 
coverage of their networks in addition to the handsets they offer. Accordingly, our discussion would be 
incomplete without an analysis of the other important areas of competition: improved networks and 
operating systems. As it turns out, many of the innovations that affect the mobile user’s experience—
and threaten to disrupt the hegemony of today’s handset makers—are occurring in these areas. 
  A.  Improved networks 
As of mid-2009, wireless carriers were  battling to be the first to implement a 4G wireless 
network. There were two major 4G technologies  in development: LTE and WiMAX. Many analysts 
forecasted that LTE would have a momentous impact on the wireless industry.
173 Verizon, AT&T, T-
Mobile, and MetroPCS are all developing LTE networks.
174  Indeed, some analysts speculated  that 
MetroPCS, which is a relatively small carrier, would  be the first to successfully implement an LTE 
network.
175 Verizon has announced that it will deploy LTE in 2010, while AT&T has indicated that that it 
will deploy LTE in 2011. In 2009, Sprint entered into a joint-venture with Clearwire and Intel to deploy a 
4G WiMAX network.
176 Sprint has rolled out a WiMAX network in Baltimore and announced planned 
launches in other cities.
177
  Many  industry observers and participants have speculated that 4G technology will have a 
revolutionary effect on the wireless industry. For instance, Nortel suggested that 4G mobile broadband 
had the potential to be a “truly disruptive technology.”
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 A recent book on wireless networks, The New 
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potential to create major disruptions not only in the wireless sector, but in communications as a 
whole.”
179
  B.  Improved operating systems 
 
  In addition to competition driven by advances in wireless carriers’  networks, advances  in 
handset operating systems promise to rearrange the entire wireless landscape. While 4G networks are 
months or years away, the next generation of mobile operating systems is imminent. As of 2009, certain 
operating systems had become well-established. According to Gartner Research, roughly half of the 
smartphones sold worldwide in 2008 ran Nokia’s Symbian operating system,
180 over 16 percent ran 
RIM’s BlackBerry operating systems, and nearly 12 percent ran Microsoft’s Windows Mobile.
  181 These 
operating systems  face  increasing  competition.  As the Economist  explained,  a battle is raging over 
“Smart-Phones’ Souls”—the next frontier of competition in the wireless market will focus on “software, 
services, and content” rather than “hardware.”
182 Some of the newest entrants into the smartphone 
operating system market are based on the open-source software Linux, which runs everything from 
servers to cell phones.
183 Open sourcing offers a low-cost alternative to proprietary software, and makes 
it easier for third parties to develop apps for a platform that runs on many different devices.
184 
Worldwide sales of Linux-based phones in 2008 were up 19 percent from the previous year, while the 
share of the once-popular Symbian operating systems slid significantly.
185
  In the summer of 2008, Google launched its Linux-based, open-source Android operating system 
with the Open Handset Alliance of 47 telecom and technology companies.
  
186 An increasing number of 
handsets run on Android. Gartner Research has estimated that Android phones comprised 20 percent of 
the Linux phones sold in the fourth quarter of 2008 worldwide.
187 In September 2008, T-Mobile was the 
first to offer an Android phone, called G1, built by HTC.
188
                                                           
179.  Scott A. Snyder, The Swarm Analogy and the Wireless Revolution, FINANCIAL TIMES PRESS, Jul. 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1377269&seqNum=6. 
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for prime time,” Sprint CEO Dan Hesse has said.
189 BusinessWeek claims that “Android has a better than 
decent shot” at building a substantial competitive presence.
190 Other companies, including Samsung, LG, 
and Motorola, are set to bring out Android-based phones in the near future.
191 Google notes that as 
many as 18 different Android phones will be available by the end of 2009.
192
In mid-2009, Verizon was reportedly close to offering an Android-based  Motorola phone 
(codenamed  “Sholes”), which would support multi-touch input, an eight-megapixel camera, and 
powerful graphics hardware to appeal to mobile gamers.
 Another Motorola Android phone, named 
“Morisson,” was reportedly being sold through T-Mobile. Confirmation of these reports is expected at 
the Motorola Motodev Summit in October 2009.
  
193 In August 2009, Motorola confirmed for its investors 
that it will be shipping Android-based phones.
194
  Finally,  Linux Mobile  (“LiMo”)  is  being developed by an association of 50 technology and 
telecommunications companies,
 
195 including Samsung and Vodafone.
196 LiMo, however, differs from 
WebOS  (which runs the Pre) and Android in that the consortium is focusing on building a flexible 
operating system rather than a user interface.
197 Phones built with LiMo will not have the distinctive 
user experiences that iPhone, Android, or WebOS phones carry; yet the software has attracted new 
members to the consortium for its potential to cut development costs while leaving phone makers 
flexible to create their own user interfaces.
198 Currently LiMo boasts over 30 handsets, including several 
models by Motorola, NEC, and Panasonic.
199
V.  Learning from Past Mistakes 
 
In dynamic industries, regulators need be more tolerant of new technologies that appear to be 
dominant. Unfortunately, the Federal Communications Commission appears not to have always heeded 
this advice. The agency has at times prematurely declared certain technologies as being dominant, and 
imposed harmful regulation. In the late 1970s,  it  required  that  wireline telephone companies 
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“unbundle” telephone equipment from telephone services;
200 in 1981, it extended this requirement to 
the cellular operations of the telephone companies.
201  Accordingly, cellular providers that were 
affiliated with wireline telephone companies could not sell mobile handsets, nor could they offer certain 
additional services such as voicemail.
202
Skeptics might ask: What is the harm from declaring a technology in a dynamic industry to be 
dominant? Can’t the regulation, as in the case of cellular unbundling rules, be reversed? Unfortunately, 
reversing  an inefficient  policy may not eliminate the harm, especially when the harm results from 
delaying the introduction of a new technology. After imposing regulations on cellular carriers in the 
early 1980s  that barred the bundling of handsets with service, the FCC eventually recognized that 
competition  between the cellular licensees rendered such regulation unnecessary,  and in 1992, it 
allowed the bundling of cellular service and mobile phones.
 As we explained above, these regulations likely reduced welfare 
because handset makers could not properly incentivize wireless operators to invest in an efficient level 
of promotion and device-specific infrastructure. 
203
Empirical evidence suggests that the FCC’s intervention in the mobile handset market may have 
postponed the development of the U.S. wireless industry between 1981 and 1992. Although we lack 
data for U.S. handset sales prior to 1990, global CDMA sales serve as a reasonable proxy for U.S. handset 
sales around that time: CDMA was adopted by the Telecommunications Industry Association as the 
North American digital cellular standard in 1993, and it was standardized for Personal Communications 
Services in the United States in 1993.
 In the intervening eleven years, however, 
all the potential economies of scope associated with selling handsets and wireless services (and the 
associated consumer benefits) were squandered. And the incentive problems identified above 
concerning handset makers and distributors could not be corrected due to regulatory obstacles.  
204
                                                           
200.  Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 
Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384. 
 Figure 1 shows the growth in global handset sales by technology 
from 1983 to 2009. 
201.  Cellular Communications Systems, 86 FCC 2d 469 (1981). 
202.  The Commission similarly declared DSL providers to be dominant in the late 1990s, and forced them to 
resell their services at regulated prices—despite the fact that cable modem subscriptions vastly exceed DSL 
subscriptions.  
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No. 91-34 (1992). 
204.  CDMA Certification Forum, History of CDMA, available at http://www.globalccf.org/history_of_ 
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Source: Strategy Analytics 
According to Strategy Analytics, CDMA sales were non-existent in the 1980s, sputtered in the early and 
mid-1990s, and did not reach 10 million units until 1998. In contrast, the sales of non-CDMA phones 
reached 10 million units by 1993. Given this five-year lag, it is reasonable to ask whether the FCC’s 
prohibition of bundled handsets and wireless services along with other harmful interference described 
below significantly slowed the adoption of CDMA handsets in the United States. 
We are not the first to link the FCC’s regulatory intervention in the mobile handset market to 
reductions in consumer welfare. In a seminal article published in 1997, Professor Jerry Hausman of MIT 
estimated that the Commission’s delay in introducing cellular service cost Americans roughly $25 billion 
per year in lost welfare.
205 He attributes the delay to, among other things, the Commission’s decision to 
delay the operations of the incumbent wireline network until the non-wireline network could begin 
operations. This type of interference, like the ban on bundling handsets and wireless service, squarely 
fits the paradigm of prematurely declaring dominance. Dr. Hausman concludes that “regulatory 
indecision made a new good, cellular telephone, unavailable in the United States when it was being 
offered in Scandinavia and Japan using equipment invented by AT&T Bell Labs.”
206
                                                           
205.  See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, Valuation and the Effect of Regulation on New Services in 
Telecommunications, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1-38 (1997).  
 To the extent that the 
FCC’s  intervention in the mobile handset market in the 1980s slowed the pace of innovation, the 
associated consumer benefits of those new services were also delayed. 
206.  Id. at 20. Page | 30 
 
 VI.  Conclusion 
  Our overarching conclusion is that regulators should be very reluctant to intervene in the mobile 
handset market given the pace of innovation, the lack of any apparent anticompetitive motivation for 
exclusive contracts, and the significant efficiencies associated with exclusive agreements. Given the pace 
of technology development in the mobile handset market, the iPhone’s position is hardly guaranteed. A 
new device could render the iPhone obsolete quickly. Ironically, the best way to replace to the iPhone 
could be through an exclusive contract between a handset maker and some other carrier. 
  Regulators may not fully incorporate the economic cost of intervention in their decision making 
because it is hard to assess the  innovation that would have occurred in the absence of such 
intervention.  In contrast, the benefits of intervention are easier to assess,  and there is often a 
constituency that stands to reap those benefits. For example, some small rural carriers argue that 
terminating the iPhone-AT&T exclusive would enable them to offer the iPhone and more aggressively 
compete with AT&T for customers.  
But do rural carriers or non-AT&T national carriers need access to the iPhone to compete 
effectively with AT&T? Our analysis in Part II shows that, while the iPhone is certainly special, there is 
nothing about it that constitutes a must-have input from the perspective of economics. The question 
should not be whether a company such as Cellular South would benefit with access to the iPhone (it 
likely would), but rather whether Cellular South needs the iPhone to constrain the price of AT&T’s 
wireless offerings, so that consumers would benefit. We are not aware of any evidence that AT&T has 
been able to raise its wireless prices as a result of its exclusive contract with Apple. 
  Regulations that prohibited exclusive contracts for handsets also would impose significant costs, 
as described above in Part III. Specifically, the efficiencies made possible by an exclusive agreement—
superior innovation in design, coordination and development between device manufacturers and 
network providers to optimize the consumer experience with the device and the supporting services and 
shared risk in deploying massive marketing and consumer awareness campaigns—would no longer be 
available to handset makers, wireless carriers, and their customers. Indeed, the next iconic device that 
requires an exclusive contract to get off the ground would simply not be developed. These are real 
costs, but because they are harder to assess, policymakers who may be subject to political pressures 
may pay insufficient attention to them. 
In summary, we are not good at predicting the future of technology, especially when markets 
are subject to rapid change. Precisely because the mobile handset market is so dynamic, regulators 
should err on the side of doing less. If a dominant handset emerges that is effectively sealed off by 
virtue of an exclusive contract, we believe that antitrust authorities could swiftly curb any abuse. In the 
meantime, the availability of exclusive agreements  between  wireless  carriers and handset 
manufacturers should make it more likely that the next big thing in mobile handsets emerges sooner 
rather than later. 